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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-3210
_____________
MARK D. DEHAINAUT,
Appellant
v.
CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA STATE
SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-10-cv-00899
District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 30, 2012
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 25, 2012)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Mark D. DeHainaut, who was an associate professor at California University of
Pennsylvania (CALU), taught on-line and on-campus courses from 2002 to 2007. In
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April of 2008, he suffered a hemorrhagic stroke, which limited his activities of daily
living. As a result, he sought an accommodation from CALU that would enable him to
teach only on-line courses. CALU declined to provide the accommodation. Thereafter,
DeHainaut commenced this civil action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. He asserted several claims, including a claim under
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, against CALU and the Pennsylvania State
System of Higher Education (PSSHE). A motion to dismiss resulted in the filing of an
amended complaint, which alleged disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of
the Rehabilitation Act. After an initial case management conference, the case proceeded
to mediation.
The mediator explored the expectations of the parties and the merits of
DeHainaut’s claims. As the mediation session concluded, DeHainaut’s counsel prepared
a handwritten document entitled “MEMO OF AGREEMENT.” It set forth the terms of
the settlement reached by the parties and the date of the mediation. The document was
signed by DeHainaut, his wife (even though she was not a party to the lawsuit), his
counsel, and counsel for CALU and the PSSHE. The terms set forth a formula for
calculating an award of back wages, provided that CALU would cooperate with
DeHainaut’s application for disability retirement, which would entitle him to health care
benefits commensurate with any other retiree, required the execution of a release and
settlement agreement, established that DeHainaut’s employment would terminate at the
conclusion of the 2010-2011 academic year and that he would not apply for further
employment, and obligated CALU to pay for the cost of the mediation.
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Several days later, counsel for CALU and the PSSHE advised DeHainaut’s
counsel of the back pay award calculated under the formula. To the surprise of both
counsel, the amount was lower than the $35,000 figure contemplated by CALU at the
mediation. Nonetheless, counsel advised that CALU and the PSSHE were willing to
tender that amount plus an additional sum to reach the $35,000 figure it had envisioned
the formula would yield. DeHainaut was not receptive to the news, and he eventually
retained new counsel. CALU and PSSHE then filed a motion to enforce the settlement.
At a hearing on the motion before the District Court, the mediator and DeHainaut’s
former counsel testified about the mediation proceeding. According to the mediator,
although DeHainaut and his wife “grudgingly” signed the agreement, he was of the belief
that a settlement had been reached.
After consideration of the record, the District Court granted the motion to enforce
the settlement. It found that the “parties entered into an agreement at the mediation
session on March 4, 2011, the material terms of which were agreed upon by both parties
and memorialized in the Memo of Agreement written by [DeHainaut’s] then counsel, and
are sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced.” [A13] The Court noted that the
settlement varied from DeHainaut’s subjective expectations, but that he “grudgingly”
agreed to the terms. The Court rejected DeHainaut’s contention that he was forced to
sign the document before he could leave the mediation, finding credible the testimony of
DeHainaut’s former counsel to the contrary. The Court concluded that the signatures of
DeHainaut and his wife demonstrated that they “understood at that moment that the
resolution of the litigation had been reached.”
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This timely appeal followed. 1

Because the District Court conducted an

evidentiary hearing, we review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error, and
conduct plenary review of the issues of law. See Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031
n.5 (3d Cir. 1991).
We apply Pennsylvania state law to the enforceability of the parties’ settlement
agreement.

Id. at 1033.

In Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1999), the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that:
The enforceability of settlement agreements is governed by principles of
contract law. To be enforceable, a settlement agreement must possess all of
the elements of a valid contract. As with any contract, it is essential to the
enforceability of a settlement agreement that the minds of the parties should
meet upon all the terms, as well as the subject-matter, of the [agreement].
Where the parties have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact
that they intend to formalize their agreement in writing but have not yet
done so does not prevent enforcement of such agreement.
Id. at 536 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). After review of the record
before us, we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the parties
had reached an agreement at the mediation session. We appreciate DeHainaut’s assertion
that the District Court erred in finding that the parties had resolved their dispute as the
key terms of the settlement, i.e., the amount of the back pay to be paid and the provision
of medical benefits, had yet to be definitively determined. Nonetheless, we will not
disturb the District Court’s finding because the Court explained that the agreement
concerned the formula to be used in computing the back pay award and the mechanism
by which DeHainaut could pursue the desired medical coverage.
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The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have final order
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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DeHainaut also contends that the District Court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that the Memo of Agreement was sufficiently definite to constitute an
enforceable agreement. In DeHainaut’s view, the Memo of Agreement failed to establish
the key terms of the settlement, the amount of the back pay award and the continuation of
medical coverage. We agree that the absence of these terms in some circumstances might
preclude a determination that the material terms of an agreement had been reached by the
parties. But under the circumstances before us, where what the parties agreed to was a
formula to utilize in calculating the back pay and a means to pursue a continuation of
medical coverage, we find no error by the District Court in concluding that the Memo of
Agreement contained the necessary elements of a contract.
DeHainaut further challenges the District Court’s order enforcing the settlement
on the ground that CALU and PSSHE did not have requisite authority to settle the
dispute. This issue was not raised in the District Court and we will not consider it for the
first time on appeal. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929,
932 (3d Cir. 1976).
Finally, DeHainaut asserts that because this settlement is of a claim that his civil
rights were violated, CALU and PSSHE must demonstrate that he executed the Memo of
Agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Appellant’s Br. at 39 (citing W.B. v. Matula, 67
F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995) (overruled on other grounds)).

The District Court’s

Memorandum Opinion demonstrates that it fully considered the totality of the
circumstances and concluded that the circumstances demonstrated that DeHainaut knew
he was signing a settlement and that the terms were not as favorable as those for which he
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had hoped. The voluntariness of DeHainaut’s execution is further supported by the
District Court’s finding that his former counsel credibly testified that DeHainaut was not
forced to sign the Memo of Agreement in order to leave the mediation session.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting the
motion to enforce the settlement.
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